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Promoting Universal Human Rights:
Dilemmas of Integrating Developing
Countries
Mahmood Monshipourit
It is a normal, even necessary, process to debate
universal human rights in an effort to retain what is still
sound and valid, and to make changes as moral and
political judgment dictate. But how to protect human




We are in a new era of human rights and globalization. The dramatic
changes brought about by the end of the Cold War, partly as a consequence
of the wider introduction of communication and information technology
and partly as a result of trade liberalization, prompted a global drive
toward neo-liberal economic reforms and democratization. A
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comprehensive portrayal of global changes denotes a convergence
phenomenon spawned by a global flow of information and cultural
homogenization. An emerging strategy of "borderless solidarity," which
links single issues such as environmental degradation, women's rights, and
racism, serves as an example of how interconnected various dimensions of
social life are and how such resistance to globalization gains firm
grounding.2 Some of the more contentious issues of our times have to do
with unintended consequences of the post-Cold War era and its unforeseen
problems, including civil wars, ethnic strife, sectarian conflict, genocide,
rape as a terror campaign, refugee flows, and international trafficking in
human beings for both sexual purposes and sweatshop labor.3
It is within this context that developing countries' receptivity as well as
resistance to global human rights standards must be understood. The
thesis argued here is two-fold: (1) that an effective promotion of human
rights in the context of globalization requires a deeper understanding of its
effects on the most vulnerable people, and (2) that to the extent that
globalizing human rights standards overlook the complexity of local
conditions and constraints, the promotion of the universal view of human
rights will do little to ensure their realization in the developing world.
This paper's main thrust concerns the de facto conditions of
underdevelopment and the constraints they pose to the application of
global norms. It is also important to bear in mind that the Global North
does not always practice what it preaches, asserting universal human
rights standards but not really following them. For example, considerable
controversy has surrounded the neo-liberal reform agendas of the
international financial institutions (IFIs) and the mechanisms by which
their macroeconomic decisions have been forced upon developing
countries. A debate has emerged on the issue of whether the imposition of
such global decisions constrains or enables developing countries' national
policy choices.
The foregoing assertions, however, should not be construed as a
defense of cultural relativism, for there is a difference between adhering
less to some global standard of human rights in order to promote overall
human rights in socioeconomic realms and not adhering to certain rights
because of a lack of political will or hiding behind the mask of cultural
relativism.
2. See JAMES H. MITTELMAN, THE GLOBALIZATION SYNDROME: TRANSFORMATION AND
RESISTANCE 178 (2000) (chapter coauthored with Christine B.N. Chin).
3. The United Nations' reports indicate that trafficking in people is now the fastest-
growing business of organized crime. In the last decade or so, it is estimated, "more than 30
million women and children may have been trafficked within and from Southeast Asia for
sexual purposes and sweatshop labor." The report adds that this trend is also visible in the
countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. This development, which involves
sexual exploitation, economic slavery, forced labor and debt enslavement, and exploitation of
migrants, amounts to a classic form of slavery. Taken together, one UN official notes,
trafficking in human beings is "the biggest violation of human rights in the world." See
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Consider, for example, the highly politicized "Asian values" debate,
which urges Asians to become modem but in local ways, and regards
order and stability as preconditions for economic growth and growth as
the basic foundation of any political order that purports to enhance human
dignity.4 A similar logic is reflected in the belief underlying the prevailing
anthropological view that human rights are not based on abstract moral
grounds; rather, they are a function of indigenous and concrete social
struggles.5  To these arguments, one can bring several important
qualifications. As Andrew Hurrell reminds us, the most pressing ethical
dilemmas of advancing universal human rights are as much about practice
and power as they are about philosophical foundations.6 To work towards
achieving a practical consensus that is politically potent and morally
meaningful, Hurrell notes, requires that we "downplay concern with
foundations" and "build on and develop the human rights culture and
community that has evolved in practice-the element of consensus visible
in the actual practice of states." There is also broad consensus that the
respect for and legal enforcement of certain fundamental human rights
transcend the developing world's historical specificity and cultural
contexts."
Below, I first explore theoretical discourses surrounding the role of the
state in the developing world, identifying different views on the demise,
disarray, and persistence of the state. Second, I analyze the intersection
between three thematic areas critical to understanding public policy: (1) the
development-democracy nexus, (2) child labor, and (3) health. There
continues to be disagreement over the connection between democracy and
development policies and the many implications that flow from such
interconnections. The debate rages over whether child labor is a denial of
human rights or necessary to confronting abject poverty. Similarly, with
regard to the right to health and heath care, the controversy continues
4. Bilahari Kausikan, Singapore's permanent representative to the United Nations,
argues that Asians place greater value on honesty, self-discipline, and order. The fact is, he
argues, Western-style democracy cannot be defended by abstract values or reasoning. For
international norms to become universally recognized, such norms must evolve through
ongoing debate between different perspectives and value systems. One must be sensitive to
the realities of exercising authority in Asian societies characterized by "heterogeneous,
unevenly modernized, and imperfectly integrated societies with large rural populations and
shallow Western-style civic traditions." Bilahari Kausikan, Asian versus 'Universal' Human
Rights, 7 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 9, 18 (1997).
5. Richard A. Wilson argues that human rights are a question of historical, local, and
cultural context, and that historical context of actions and intentions better illuminates the
cross-cultural applicability of human rights. See Richard A. Wilson, Human Rights, Culture and
Context: An Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURE AND CoNTEXT: ANTHROPOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 1, 16-17 (Richard A. Wilson ed., 1997). Wilson criticizes the limitations of
cultural relativism, arguing that culture must not be seen as shared or normative; rather, it
must be viewed as cross-cut by social differences (age, caste, and gender), which are
contested, contextualized, and emergent. See id. at 9.
6. See Andrew Hurrell, Power, Principles and Prudence: Protecting Human Rights in a
Deeply Divided World, in HUMAN RIGHITS IN GLOBAL POLmcs 277, 278 (Tim Dunne and
Nicholas J. Wheeler eds., 1999).
7. Id. at 299.
8. See text accompanying infra note 37.
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between those who support an activist role for the state and those who
wish for minimal interference with the free market. Third, in the course of
this discussion, we encounter several different questions. How can states
govern effectively in the face of simultaneous localizing and globalizing
pressures? Should the state be empowered to protect certain fundamental
human rights? Can the human rights situation be separated from the
political economy of development? Finally, I examine the dilemmas that
lie at the heart of contemporary debates over states' choices in a globalizing
world. As we deal with these questions, it is useful to define the
developing world and globalizing human rights standards.
II. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEFINED
The developing world is neither a monolithic political entity nor a
homogeneous cultural domain. The concept of a monolithic "Third
World," as Martin W. Lewis writes, "fails to show the profound variations
in different states' connections with and participation in the global
economy."' It may be preferable to use a set of terms, Lewis continues, that
are highly descriptive but lack theoretical preconceptions about the
ultimate roots of global economic differentiation, hence his preference for
the term "poor parts of the world."" The diverse countries that make up
the developing world render any generalization about that label difficult.
An understanding of the differentiation of a whole host of indicators
(ethnicity, political process, history, sub-national forces, etc.) is needed if
one is to grasp the term. The developing countries' distinguishing features,
however, reveal some common characteristics: poverty, overpopulation,
colonial history, corruption, mismanagement, and personalized politics.
The least developed countries (those in sub-Sahara Africa and South
Asia), stand to lose in today's global economy, while other developing
countries known as the "pivotal states" have much to gain. This reference
to "pivotal states" in the U.S. foreign policymaking process is made in the
context of refashioning U.S. strategy vis-A-vis the developing world along
more coherent lines. This necessitates discussing which U.S. interests in
the developing world are most important and what should be done to
preserve them. The pivotal states strategy presents "new security"
issues-including environmental degradation, overpopulation, and
underdevelopment-as the biggest dangers to political stability. Pivotal
9. Martin W. Lewis, Is There a Third World?, 98 CURRENT HISTORY 355, 358 (1999).
10. Id. at 358.
11. The United Nations Development Programme's recent publication deals with the
issue of reducing debt of the poorest countries. It reports that slow progress in tackling the
debt issue confronting 41 heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) is a testament to how
globalization has been failing the poorest and the least developed countries. The majority of
these countries-that is, 33 countries or eighty percent of them-are in Africa. In 1997, the
total debt of these countries reached nearly $2.2 trillion. See UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 106-07 (1999). For a compelling case supporting an urgent need for action, see Eric A.
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states, which include Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, Turkey,
India, Pakistan, and Indonesia, account for one-half of the developing
world's population and are regionally influential. Their stability should be
enhanced and their collapse prevented. Chase and others argue, "Given
their size, population, geostrategic position, economic potential, [and]
capacity to affect global and regional issues... [these states] demand
focused American attention."
12
Defending a policy that affirmatively places the developing world
within U.S. global strategy, affording them a place at the table and
respecting their voices, Charles H. Norchi writes that "a pivotal states
human rights policy must be sensitive to cultural variation and not insist
on standards to which only advanced industrial societies can be held.' 3
This strategy would produce, Norchi adds, "a beneficial human rights
outcome if pivotal states became human dignity platforms," that is,
promoting sustained norms and standards in the region."
This Article is concerned mainly with those developing countries that
are ranked among the poorest and least developed countries in the world.
These countries have experienced negative economic growth. Since the
mid-1980s, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa have consistently failed to
deal effectively with their poor economic performance. One study shows
that Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone,
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zambia have had high rates of
economic decline during the period 1987-1997.1' Most of these countries
depend almost exclusively on primary commodities for their foreign
exchange earnings. Others, such as Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Gabon,
and Angola, "depend almost exclusively on the export of petroleum for
most of their foreign exchange." 6 In narrow economic terms, most of these
least developed countries have limited or no capital, technological base,
production capacity or access to international markets. Furthermore, these
countries' economies are plagued by numerous structural obstacles,
including the system of stratification (caste system in India and Nepal),
tribalism (predominantly in black Africa, parts of the Middle East and
Asia), wide inequality in the wealth/income distribution (Latin America),
demographic pressures, material and human capital scarcity, and
patriarchal socio-political institutions. These barriers limit the range and
parameters of choices available to the local policy makers. 17 How to
integrate these countries into global human rights standards brings
compelling moral challenges and dilemmas in an era of globalization.
12. Robert Chase et al., Introduction, in THE PIVOTAL STATES: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
U.S. PoLicY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 1, 8 (Robert Chase et al. eds., 1999).
13. Charles H. Norchi, A Pivotal States Human Rights Strategy, in THE PIVOTAL STATES
315, 332 (Robert Chase et. al. eds., 1999).
14. Id. at 333.
15. See Juliet Elu, Human Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Analysis and Prospects for
the Future, 17 J. THIRD WORLD STUD. 53, 54 (2000).
16. Id. at 59.
17. See Mahmood Monshipouri, Human Rights Conditions in the Third World: Historical
Realities and Prospects in the 1990s, 9 J. THIRD WORLD STUD. 80 (1992).
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III. BACKGROUND ON GLOBALIZATION
A. Economic Dimensions
While the last quarter of the twentieth century became synonymous
with economic interdependence and global telecommunications, the
beginning of the twenty-first century has coincided with the growing
importance of human rights at world stage. At both the local and global
levels, protection and promotion of human rights have become caught up
in the process of the increased flow of ideas, information, technology, and
communications links among the nations. This process has raised serious
questions concerning justice in the global economy and the welfare and
health of the poor more generally.
Globalization implies neither universality nor democratic control over
transnational and intergovernmental organizations. Multinational
corporations (MNCs), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World
Bank, and the European Commission of the European Union have rarely, if
ever, been held to the standards of democratic accountability. For
example, under IMF rules, each member has votes in accordance with a
quota that is assessed generally in proportion to its share of the world
economy. That accounts for why all IMF decisions are made by a 24-
member executive board, in which only the United States, Japan, Germany,
France, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China have
permanent seats. The IMF's mission and system of governance, as one
commentator aptly suggests, both fall well short of a sound global vision,
as they lack both representation and accountability. 8 How can it be
considered reasonable, it is asked, that decisions in the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank are made by boards of governors,
some of whom represent non-democratic governments, and where the
votes are weighted according to the raw wealth of the countries
concerned?19
Regardless of the power and scope of operations of the MNCs and IFIs,
the state still remains the cornerstone of international relations. Global
monitoring bodies, such as the Human Rights Committee established
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
lack enforcement power. Even if the Human Rights Committee is calling
upon states to act, it can have no more effect than a recommendation that
states may or may not heed. To be sure, the IFIs have enormous
significance and influence, and so do other intergovernmental
organizations. But states continue to have the real power, interests, and
autonomy.
18. See Helena Cobban, No Globalization without Representation, CHRISTIAN ScI.
MONITOR, March 9, 2000, at 11.
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The relation between democracy and economic growth is problematic
as is the connection between economic globalization and the protection of
social and economic rights. It is easy to see why. Economic globalization
has deepened inequality both within and among nation-states. 2' Issues of
distribution, unequal access, and uneven access to information have
intensified tensions within developing countries. A growing body of
evidence shows that privatization and the deregulation of markets in Latin
America have led to deepening poverty, sharpening inequalities, more
crime, and less safety.2'
It is also the case, as some analysts explain, that while democracy has
been established in South American countries, economic growth has not
ensued. Independent citizens' groups have increasingly drawn attention to
government corruption and have demanded accountability. Such
complaints were instrumental both in the 1992 scandal that brought down
Brazil's President Fernando Collor de Mello and led to the 1993
impeachment of Venezuela's President Carlos Andres Perez. ' Across the
region, the media have exposed authorities responsible for corruption
(Argentina), money laundering (Panama), and political assassination
(Mexico).23 A noticeable increase in women's representation occurred in
the Argentine House of Representatives as a result of a 1991 law stipulating
that thirty percent of the candidates for political parties must be female.24
Indigenous people throughout the region played an increasingly active
role in politics, especially in Guatemala, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Colombia.
Bolivia's reforms in the area of popular participation and decentralization
have been strikingly sweeping. In Colombia, a new mechanism known as
the tutela, introduced in the 1991 constitution, allows any citizen to go
before any judge and demand protection of her basic rights.'
Moreover, public opinion surveys reveal the impression that
governments throughout much of the region have not been capable of
dealing with rising crime, vast income inequalities, and the spread of
drugs, poverty, and unemployment. A 1996 survey by one of Brazil's
credible pollsters revealed that eighty-eight percent of Rio de Janeiro
residents believed that the local police had connections to organized
crime.2 ' Similarly, transitional democracies in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile
have all witnessed a rise in crime. In many Latin American countries, it is
argued, citizens, fairly or unfairly, associate democracy with burgeoning
crime, corruption, and deepening insecurity-which is to say, democracy
20. See, e.g., Blanca Heredia, Prosper or Perish? Development in the Age of Global Capital,
96 CuRRENT HIST. 383 (November 1997).
21. See Robert Malley, The Third Worldist Moment, 98 CuRRENT HIST. 359,369 (1999).
22. See Peter Hakim & Michael Shifter, New Beginnings: The Promise of Democracy and
Prosperity, in STAND! COMPARATIVE POLITICS: CONTENDING IDEAS AND OPINIONS 181, 181
(Rebecca Davis ed., 1999).
23. See id. at 181.
24. See id. at 181-182.
25. See id. at 182.
26. See id. at 182-1.83
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has become equated with the breakdown of law and order."
Notwithstanding the governments' firmer control over budget deficits,
tax codes, and redirection of expenditures, the region's macroeconomic
performance has failed to meet expectations. As of the late 1990s, the
growth rate was only half the region's six percent average in the 1970s, and
it lagged behind the approximately eight percent annual growth rates that
several East Asian countries have generated for the past three decades.
Only a few countries (Chile and El Salvador) have achieved much higher
average growth rates.28 Latin America holds the most unequal distribution
of income and wealth of any region in the world, with current trends
pointing to further decay: "The poorest 40 percent of the population
receive only ten percent of the region's annual income, while nearly 60
percent of the income goes to the wealthiest 20 percent."29 Such disparities,
especially when reinforced by racial and ethnic differences, would
undermine national cohesion and identification as well as democratic
values.' "The so-called liberalization of the Third Word," Robert Malley
writes, "has meant a social split, a separation, not a merging. Nor does it
pit modernity against tradition, but wealth against want."
31
Even those analysts who stress the tremendous potential benefits that
globalization has for developing countries, warn about the ways in which
globalization exacerbates inequality and heightens social tensions. One
inescapable consequence is the problem that "increased risks come with its
benefits. , 32  Globalization-in particular, privatization-presents
considerable risks of concentration of wealth unless undertaken with
effective regulation. This is a noticeable danger in small economies (e.g.,
Panama and Peru) with limited competition and high concentrations of
political and economic power. One observer points out that "(i)n a recent
poll conducted throughout Latin America, respondents agreed by three to
one with the general statement that 'markets provide the best solutions.'
But in Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Uruguay, and Panama, less than half
supported the more specific notion that privatization has been beneficial."33
The lack of support for privatization in these countries is particularly
linked to the "widespread perception that the high costs of newly
privatized services reflect the lack of real competition.""'
B. Globalizing Human Rights Standards
Globalization of democracy and human rights, in contrast, has often-
27. See id. at 183.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 184.
30. See Malley, supra note 21, at 369.
31. Id.
32. Nancy Birdsall, Managing Inequality in the Developing World, 98 CURRENT HIsT. 376
(1999).
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though not always-contributed to upholding certain civil and political
rights. The most visible signs of the globalization of human rights is the
growth of international human rights non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), global conferences, and transnational networking.' Over the past
twenty-five years, women's civil rights and reproductive rights have found
their way into the international legal and human rights agendas. The two
most relevant human rights conferences of the 1990s were the 1993 Vienna
Second World Conference on Human Rights and the 1995 Beijing Fourth
World Conference on the Status of Women. In the Vienna Declaration, for
example, for the first time, violence against women was recognized as a
human rights abuse. The Beijing Conference set an impressive agenda for
promoting human development by addressing gender inequality and
women's rights?6 Countries of the developing world displayed different
and sometimes contradictory levels of commitment to international human
rights embodied in these conferences' proceedings.
It should be noted too that some cultural traditions and state
practices-according to which global norms lack legitimacy-have come
under critical scrutiny in the developing world, with an unparalleled
degree of support for fundamental human rights. The contemporary
incarnation of this appeal to human rights has been a renewed emphasis on
"basic" rights, albeit in a context shaped by the relentless forces of history,
political economy, and culture. Emphasized by the Carter administration
(1976-1980), these core rights have become a major part of the human rights
discourse for the last quarter of the twentieth century. The emphasis on
basic rights has emerged from a principled perspective of paying special
attention to the most vulnerable members of society. These basic rights
include "the right to be free from government violation of the integrity of
the person.., the right to the fulfillment of such vital needs as food,
shelter, health care, and education.., and the right to enjoy civil and
political liberties."37
The new global economy and forces associated with neo-liberal
globalization have refocused the attention on economic, social, and cultural
rights. Many people in developing countries continue to hold the state
accountable for protecting social, economic, and cultural rights,
safeguarding the rights of minorities, and rescuing the most vulnerable-
women, children, and the poor-from a sense of powerlessness and
uncertainty about globalization. This mixed, and often conflicting,
perception of and attitude toward the role of the state requires more
nuanced methods of understanding both state-society and state-market
relations.
35. See generally Jackie Smith et al., Globalizing Human Rights: The Work of Transnational
Human Rights NGOs in the 1990s, 20 HUM. Rms. Q. 379 (May 1998) (discussing international
human rights NGOs).
36. See CHARLES W. KEGLEY, JR. & EUGENE R. WITrKOPF, WORLD POLITIcs: TREND
AND TRANSFORMATION 356 (2001).
37. HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
5-6 (1980) (quoting Cyrus Vance).
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IV. EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION: STRUCTURAL CHANGE
IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
A. The Future of the State: Alternative Views
This section of the Article is primarily concerned with two issues.
First, I examine the veracity of the widely held notion that we are
witnessing the end of the state in the developing world as many countries
in the South open up to trade and financial liberalization. 8 Secondly, I look
at the extent to which state sovereignty is viewed as part of the problem or
part of the solution in the developing world. Three views are critical to our
investigation of theoretical discourses about the role of the state in
developing countries: (1) a focus on the interventionist state, (2) the
"societal forces" thesis, and (3) the symbiotic model.
B. Rationales for the Interventionist State
There is no doubt that the growth of supra-territorial space and the rise
of market forces, including the pressures exerted on states by international
financial institutions, have posed new challenges to the role of the state in
economic policy. As international norms affect the domestic structure and
organization of states, and globalization affecting state policy, state
structure and policies, in turn, affect these global norms and processes.39
The internal political and social dynamics of the post-Cold War period
have also strained state-society relations in economically and politically
disadvantaged countries of the South, raising the vexing issue of how to
balance respect for the state's territorial sovereignty (and stability) against
the rights of self-determination enjoyed by "the peoples" of the world.
Theorizing about the intersection of these two conflicting fundamental
principles, Richard Falk writes, "As international law vests [the right of
self-determination] in 'people' rather than either 'nations' or 'states,' there
is considerable room for interpretation. " 40 Moreover, Falk points out,
"deference to the state has weakened in recent years by changes in
geopolitics, greater support for human rights, the impact of globalization,
and the countervailing emergence of a variety of micro-nationalisms and
ethnic causes."4' He cautions, however, that "support for claims of self-
determination that would shatter an existing state [are not warranted]
unless a 'people' was being victimized either by genocidal behavior or
38. See MARYANN K. CuSiMANO, BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: ISSUES FOR A GLOBAL
AGENDA (2000).
39. See IAN CLARK, GLOBALIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION: INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 6 (1997).
40. Richard Falk, The New Interventionism and the Third World, 98 CuRRENT HIsT. 370,
373 (1999).
41. Id. at 374.
[Vol. 4
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through repeated crimes against humanity, and in exceptional cases, as a
result of severe abuses of basic human rights targeted at a given ethnic
community and sustained over a period of years."
2
The right of self-determination, other experts have reminded us, is one
of the few collective rights that is legally binding. It is also the least clear
and most controversial of all human rights. This is because it is
insufficiently clear who are the bearers of the right of self-determination-
which is to say, what is the definition of a "people"? Also, the object of the
right of self-determination is not always clear; from an internal to an
external referent, the object of self-determination varies.43
Although the demise of the state is often suggested, the post-Cold War
order remains built on a foundation of sovereign states. Arguably,
globalization is not an entirely autonomous force. Historically it has been
shaped, fostered, and even stymied by wider currents of international
relations. "States still enjoy structural powers from their economic
activities," Ian Clark writes, "and, in turn if less visibly, continue to
provide the framework within which the globalized economy functions: to
that extent, globalization has a persisting need for viable states and its own
stake in their survival."4
Likewise, K. J. Holsti sees state sovereignty as the fundamental rule
underlying the foundation of some type of world order. He writes, "We
have a Westphalian system [of] order whether there are two or four great
powers, whether there are fifty or 150 states, whether we have more wars
or fewer wars, or whether there is more or less 'globalization.'- 45 We have
yet to transcend the Westphalain order: "The fundamental rules and
institutions underlying international relationships have not changed with
the end of the Cold War. Indeed, they have been strengthened."' The
problem is the crisis of governance and a return to conditions of a new
medievalism. In some parts of the developing world, we have seen the rise
of the state-as-enterprise, which is closely connected to foreign
organizations, both commercial and humanitarian: "The state has become a
giant firm, accountable to no one except local clients and foreign share-
holders."47 These conditions reflect fundamental weaknesses of state
capacity, but they cannot serve as a foundation for challenges toward
order. That is to say that order cannot be challenged by ragtag groups of
African teenagers, small mercenary armies, or by bankrupted national
treasures.4
Some tend to view globalization as a political process whose direction
is shaped by states, particularly the most powerful states and for their own
42. Id. at 375.
43. See PETER R. BAEHR, HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALITY IN PRACTICE 55-56 (1999).
44. CLARK, supra note 39, at 195 (1997).
45. Kalevi. J. Holsti, The Coming Chaos? Armed Conflict in the World's Periphery, in
INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND THE FUTURE OF WORLD POLmcs 283, 289 (T.V. Paul and John A.
Hall eds., 1999) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ORDER].
46. Id. at 289.
47. Id. at 304.
48. See id. at 305.
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ends.49 The evidence from contemporary history supports such a view:
more trade between nations has meant greater state size and more public
services. In the words of Dani Rodrik, "the social welfare state has been
the flipside of the open economy." "° Furthermore, international economic
integration is inherently unsettling, creating a tension that tears at social
stability. The tension, as Dani Rodrik notes, assumes the form of a modem
dilemma: "Globalization increases the demand for social insurance while
simultaneously constraining the ability of governments to respond
effectively to that demand. Consequently, as globalization deepens, the
social consensus required to keep [the] domestic market open to
international trade erodes. 1 Privatization and liberalization of economy
would result in cuts in government subsidies to the poor, undermining the
ability of the state to provide social welfare programs for those in desperate
need.
"The economic logic of globalization," Peter Evans points out, "does
not in itself dictate" the eclipse of the state.52 Robust and capable states are
in the interests of transnational corporations (TNCs).53 And Peter F.
Drucker points out that while "basic economic decisions are made in and
by the global economy rather than the nation-state,"" losing its fiscal and
monetary sovereignty has not made the state any weaker.55
One argument supportive of a strong and legitimate state is the need
for economic development, political stability, and conflict management. In
those developing countries where person, life, and property are in constant
jeopardy, the restoration of order can be a defense of human rights.' Also,
a great deal of institution building is required to make environmental
protection feasible in the developing world. Sophisticated institutions are
indispensable for assessing environmental impacts. "At a minimum, the
state must have the capacity to decide authoritatively what development is
sustainable. 5 7 Scholars have said that in times of major change the state
needs to play the dual role of entrepreneur and conflict manager. In both
roles, the state is seen as an active agent in economic change.4 In Malaysia,
a combination of a market friendly orientation and proactive role of the
49. See id. at 197.
50. Dani Rodrik, Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization Debate, 107 FOREIGN POL'Y 19,
26 (1997).
51. Id. at 26.
52. Peter Evans, The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of
Globalization, 50 WORLD PoLITcs 62, 73-74 (1997).
53. See id. at 69-70.
54. Peter F. Drucker, The Global Economy and the Nation-State, FOREIGN AFF.,
Sept./Oct. 1997, at 159, 163.
55. See id. at 164.
56. Somalia in the 1990s, for example, epitomized a weak state where disorder led to
grave human rights deprivations.
57. Michael Holley, Sustainable Development in Central America: Translating Regional
Environmental Accords into Domestic Enforcement Action, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 109 (1998)
(emphasis in original).
58. See Ha-Joon Change & Robert Rowthorn, Role of the State in Economic Change:
Entrepreneurship and Conflict Management, in THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN ECONOMIC CHANGE 31,
46 (Ha-Joon Change & Robert Rowthorn eds., 1995).
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government proved to be an effective development approach for the period
between 1957-1995."9 In the present era, there is a need for a responsible
state as that actively collaborates with the private sector (market) and civil
society.60
Increasingly, the Washington Consensus, which entails market-
oriented policies and the pursuit of neo-liberal economic policies, is being
challenged by a latent Southern Consensus. The latter combines the
primacy of economic development characteristic of an East Asian economic
model with that of a corporatist model of growth, revolving around close
state-business ties that have in the past typified Latin American economies.
The successful implementation of "productive" development policies,
growth-oriented macroeconomic policy, and government-business
cooperation has shown the advantages of a pragmatic developmental state.
In such a state, the policies are executed, to the extent possible, "through
private initiative rather than public ownership, and through the market
mechanism rather than administrative controls."6' To this end, government
plays a key role in both encouraging the private sector and in harnessing
its "aggressive pursuit of profits" in order to promote national interest.
This, in turn, necessitates an increase in state capacities, not state
minimalism." The Asian crisis has prompted some observers, such as
Joseph Stiglitz, to argue the need for a "post-Washington Consensus" - a
new paradigm that "should seek to achieve broader objectives -
embracing a focus on the living standards of people and the promotion of
equitable, sustainable and democratic development.
" 6
The increase in state capacities, which has been backed by electoral
politics in most cases, has generated no major redistribution of wealth,
income, or power.' Old and new inequalities persist. Civil and political
rights remain the only ways to provide a check on state performance.
Strong arid legitimate states are very much in the interest of the
international community. Without reliable actors to deal with, very little
can be accomplished. The political vacuum left in Africa after the Cold
War, when superpowers disengaged themselves from those countries
.whose geopolitical significance had dramatically declined or been thrown
in doubt, continues to plague that continent and the entire world.
Combined with a series of economic crises that began in the 1970s,' this
59. See Thamir Salih & Dale Colyer, A Case Study of Structural Transformations, Trade
and Poverty in Malaysia's Socioeconomic Development, 1960-95, 10 INT'L J. COM. & MGMT. 24, 24
(2000).
60. See Charles A. Reilly, Balancing State, Market, and Civil Society: NGOs for a New
Development Consensus, in POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA 169, 176 (victor E.
Tokman & Guillermo O'Donnell eds., 1998).
61. Charles Gore, The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for
Developing Countries, 28 WORLD DEV. 789, 797 (2000).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 799.
64. See Hakim & Shifter, supra note 22, at 181. Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and
Venezuela serve as examples of countries with strong governments and enormous inequality
of income and wealth in the region. See id, at 182.
65. See Mick Moore, Death without Taxes: Democracy, State Capacity, and Aid Dependence
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contributed to the current state of affairs, where African countries are seen
as weak states, vulnerable to political instability, with the serious potential
of requiring emergency assistance from the international community.
C. Societal Forces within States
From another perspective, neither state nor market, but rather societal
forces determine how different countries respond to the challenges of
globalization. States must function in a broader and deeper framework of
relationships in order to tackle the pressing problems of our times. To
confront the forces of fragmentation in world politics-ethnic violence,
international crime, the drug trade, and financial crisis--states must either
join supranational organizations, known as intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs), or rely on the services of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs).
Some scholars argue that the hallmark of the East Asian countries'
"economic miracle" is their eclecticism-that is, a combination of the neo-
liberal economy and the strong state influence on the economy." Beyond
the state and market, one has to factor in the role and the nature of society,
culture, history, and the evolving international economy. Moreover, state
political or religious leaders do not have a monopoly on interpreting local
culture and values. It is critically significant to be sensitive to the
heterogeneity within each country and culture. "It is important," Amartya
Sen aptly argues, "to listen to the voices of dissent in each society. " "
Nation-states and cultures, Sen continues, "are not particularly good units
to understand and analyze intellectual and political differences.""
Some observers argue that alternatives put forward by post-
development thinkers, who underscore the importance of civil society and
globalization, fall short of addressing the necessity of emancipatory
projects directed at the global underclasses and the issue of inequality.'
The experience of nearly three decades of worldwide democratization
suggests that "[wlithout political institutionalization or socioeconomic
development, an expansive and mobilized civil society is likely to be an
unpredictable actor producing potentially destabilizing effects."7'
Socioeconomic development, so goes the argument, is pivotal to the
survival of both democracy and civil society, especially in those countries
in which the fate of democratic consolidation remains uncertain. Those
in the Fourth World, in THE DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATE: POLrTCS AND INSTITrrTONAL
DESIGN 84, 108 (Mark Robinson & Gordon White eds., 1998).
66. See Steve Chan et al., Looking Beyond the Developmental State, in BEYOND THE
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE: EAST ASIA'S POLMCAL ECONOMIES RECONSIDERED 1, 3 (Steve Chan et
al. eds., 1998).
67. Amartya Sen, Universal Truth: Human Rights and the Westernizing Illusion,
HARVARD INT'L REV., Summer 1998, at 43.
68. Id.
69. See Omar G. Encarnaci6n, Tocqueville's Missionaries: Civil Socieh Advocacy and the
Promotion of DemocraCy,WORLD POL'Y J., Spring 2000, at 9.
70. Id. at 17.
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democracies in Latin America that have achieved consolidation (in
particular, Costa Rica, Chile, and Uruguay) have all reached high levels of
political institutionalization, as manifested by their strong political
parties.7
The preoccupation with civil society and global studies also ignores the
role states play in development in the developing world. "It is tragic,"
Frans J. Schuurman writes, "that, at the moment that many Third World
countries are finally starting to get rid of undemocratic regimes, the
national state is robbed of its importance."' Schuurman adds that "it
would be highly premature for development studies to replace the
paradigmatic importance of the state by that of civil society."'73 Given
Schurrman's point that states are being robbed of their importance in light
of a growing significance of a global capitalist system,74 and given the
democratic deficit associated with the opaque nature and character of
many international organizations, the weakening of the state is bound to be
problematic for people's realization of their rights.
D. Symbiotic National and Transnational Relations
Globalization has divergent impacts on states. Some trends weaken
the state (capital transformation or global capitalism) and some trends
strengthen nation-states (most "new social movements" "demand more
regulation by their own nation-state through its legal or welfare
agencies"m ). Some trends displace national regulation to international and
transnational networks; other trends simultaneously strengthen nation-
states and transnationalism.76 Some experts regard the present context as a
kind of symbiosis between the national and transnational. Says one
scholar, "most 'transnational' economic relations cannot be necessarily
equated with a global universalism. The bulk of capitalist activity is more
'trilateral' than global, being concentrated in the three regions of the
advanced 'North': Europe, North America, and East Asia."m  In general,
capitalism retains a geo-economic order dominated by the economies of the
advanced nation-states. This form of globalization reinforces national
networks of interaction.
Michael Mann argues that "stable government, social order, and
education and health systems still seem the minimum of what substantial
foreign investment and economic development require.... These all
require social organization coordinated at the national or state-level -
71. See id.
72. Frans J. Schuurman, Paradigms lost, Paradigms regained? Development Studies in the
Twenty-First Century, 21 TFIRD WORLD Q. 7, 18 (2000).
73. Id. at 19.
74. See id. at 18.
75. Michael Mann, Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State? in
INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 45, at 257.
76. See id. at 259.
77. Id. at 245.
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what other agency can provide them?" 8
E. Economic and Financial Dilemmas
The dominant discourse in the international political economy is that
the global economy is largely driven by inevitable market forces and the
pressures of international competition. Capital flows, merger, and
acquisition of foreign direct investment (FDI) have indeed become the
yardstick of integration into global economy.9 Economic liberalism, global
currency trade, and international financial institutions have in some areas
given rise to conditions that exacerbate economic inequities. Economic
liberalization, for example, has brought no tangible benefits to the rural
poor in Mexico. "Under NAFTA," some experts point out, "both the
number and proportion of the extremely poor have grown." "O The
"maquilization" of Mexico's economy,"' they continue, has been
accompanied by even deeper impoverishment of the country's
underprivileged. Maquiladora workers, not typically regarded as poor,
12have grown poorer under the country's liberalization programs.
The poor countries of the developing world have also become
increasingly vulnerable to shocks and fluctuations emanating from the
world of global finance. The free-floating exchange rate, a measure pushed
by the IMF, has brought havoc upon currencies of some countries in the
developing world. The West blamed the "Asian flu" on Asian
Governments' macro-level mismanagement. As a result, the IMF and the
World Bank imposed stiff measures on these countries as a precondition
for loans. Malaysia's Mohathir Mohammad placed the blame elsewhere:
"The free trade system has destroyed the Asian economies. "83 Regardless
of which view one adopts, the "Asian flu" illustrates the danger of
78. Id. at 252.
79. See Grahame Thompson, Economic Globalization?, in A GLOBALIZATION WORLD?
CULTURE, ECONOMICS, POLITICS 85, 108 (David Held ed., 2000).
80. Joel Brenner et al., Neoliberal Trade and Investment and the Health of Maquiladora
Workers on the U.S.-Mexico Border, in DYING FOR GROWTH: GLOBAL INEQUALITY AND T4E
HEALTH OF THE POOR 261, 287 (Jim Yong Kim et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter DYING FOR
GROWTH].
81. The term "maquilization" refers to Mexico's economic strategy of establishing the
Border Industrialization Program (BIP). This strategy, which was put in work in the mid-
1960s, was designed to attract foreign capital to the areas adjacent to or along its border with
the United States. The BIP created an export-processing zone (EPZ) along the border, giving
foreign corporations incentives to build assembly plants there to create employment for
Mexico's labor surplus. These plants have boosted job opportunities for many laborers,
including female paid workers in manufacturing operations. According to one study, "by the
late 1980s there were almost 260 EPZs in sixty-seven countries around the world, most
prominently in Asia, the Caribbean and the maquiladora areas along the Mexican frontier with
the USA." JAN AART SCHOLTE, GLOBALIZATION: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 77-78 (2000).
These plants, no longer confined to areas along the border, came to be known as maquiladoras.
See also Brenner et al., supra note 80, at 261.
82. Brenner et al., supra note 80, at 288.
83. CNNfn, Mahathir Blasts Speculators (Jan. 30, 1999), available at
<http://cnnfn.cnn.com/1999/01/30/europe/davos mahathir/> (last visited Apr. 25, 2001).
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unmanaged globalization, as well as the inability of governments to pull
back the rein of currency dealers and speculators.
Perhaps the most controversial impacts of the globalization of finance
on the developing world stem from portfolio investment and short-term
flows. Portfolio investment, or liquid capital, flies by night, and fast. It is
profit-driven (understandably so, given that "higher returns" indeed
constitute the key preoccupation of the portfolio managers) and often
results in crony capitalism. Such short-term investment-flows spur purely
speculative economic activities such as arbitrage, causing widespread
economic disruption in developing countries, especially in East Asia.m
Known as "hot money," these investments render developing countries'
governments vulnerable to short-term profiteering.n In such uncertain
investments, poor-country governments face colossal difficulties making
the long-term budgetary commitments necessary for real improvements in
health and welfare.6 In Indonesia, the panicked flight of foreign portfolio
investment in 1997 dealt severe blows to the country's economy. Child
malnutrition, once entirely under control, has resurfaced as a pervasive
public health threat.
7
The imposition of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and
privatization on developing countries by international financial institutions
has had adverse impacts on the health of the poor. The economically
disadvantaged segments of the society, some observers note, continue to
serve as the "sentinel chickens" or "mine shaft canaries" of the global
economy.8 In Nicaragua, for example, SAPs have failed either to make
more efficient use of limited resources in the health sector or to mobilize
local resources through decentralized planning. In the 1990s, Nicaragua
experienced its worst recorded epidemics of malaria, a disease
predominantly affecting the very poor, both rural and ex-rural.
Deteriorating public salaries and a lack of national leadership, caused
partly by the country's SAPs, have resulted in a noticeable loss of morale in
the public sector and have led some experts to call for the roll-back and
84. See generally RANJiT GILL, BLACK SEPTEMBER (1997) (describing the devastating
impacts that portfolio investment has had on Southeast Asia). See also MITTELMAN, supra note
2, at 235 (describing discontent over the absence of order in the global capital market).
85. It should be noted that portfolio investment has been highly concentrated and
uneven. According to UN studies, over three-quarters of portfolio investment has gone only
to those countries that are known as the "emerging markets," such as Brazil, India, and
Turkey. While Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) continues to be the largest source of private
financial flows, short-term portfolio investments in recent years have grown at a faster rate.
Between 1990 and 1995, the annual movement of these short-term flows in the developing
world surged from $3.2 billion to $45.7 billion as a number of developing countries opened up
their economies to liberalized global financial systems. See UNITED NATIONS, 1999 WORLD
SURVEY ON THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT: GLOBALIZATION, GENDER AND WORK 7
(1999).
86. See John Gershman & Alec Irwin, Getting a Grip on the Global Economy, in DYING
FOR GROWTH, supra note 80, at38-39.
87. See id. at 41.
88. Paul Farmer & Didi Bertrand, Hypocrisies of Development and the Health of the
Haitian Poor, in DYING FOR GROWTH, supra note 80, at 87.
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reevaluation of some policy measures of structural adjustment.89
Structural adjustment and privatization has had a debilitating effect on
the malaria control system. In 1990, a voluntary retirement plan was
,established to curtail public payrolls. It was applied indiscriminately in the
health sector, resulting in the elimination of 500 of the 4,000 posts for
nurses and doctors.' Many staff members of the malaria control program
resigned. Moreover, many rural people, dependent largely on small farms,
were deprived of much needed credit, which increasingly went to export-
oriented industries. Searching for better living conditions, these people
rushed to Managua, the capital city, swelling the ranks of urban slums in
the 1990s. By the mid-1990s, approximately one-third of the country's
population lived in the capital, making Managua a major focus for malaria
transmission.9  From 1992 to 1996, the incidence of malaria in the
population tripled. The public health authorities called for a radically
revised strategy, including strengthening the technical capacity of national
staff, preventing the loss of experienced staff to the private sector, and re-
establishing universal access without user fees for examination of self-
referring patients' blood slides. Local volunteers were called upon to
facilitate the collection of blood samples, administration of directly
observed anti-malarial therapy, the upgrading of preventive methods, the
promotion of community health education, and the identification of useful
local strategies to reduce transmission.
92
SAPs have routinely imposed unbearable and unjust burdens on the
most powerless people of the developing world: women, children, and the
wretchedly poor-groups that lack effective social protection in most low-
income countries. In the 1980s and 1990s the IFIs imposed SAPs on forty-
two African governments as a condition for new loans.93 Many Africans
have suffered negative consequences. The experiences of Benin, C6te
d'Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zaire bear this out.' After two decades,
"more Africans are poorer and less healthy than at the beginning of the
SAP era." The interplay between powerlessness, poverty, and disease
validates the widely held assumption that "disease epidemics result from
social processes. " 9
More recently, these IFI-related economic reforms have been renamed
under two new IMF initiatives: the Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility (ESAF) and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).
The latter rubric has come into play after the 1999 G-7 meetings in Cologne,
89. See Richard Garfield, Malaria Control in Nicaragua: Social and Political Influences on
Disease Transmission and Control Activities, 354 LANCET 414, 417 (1999).
90. See id. at 416.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 417.
93. See Brooke G. Schoepf et al., Theoretical Therapies, Remote Remedies: SAPs and the
Political Ecology of Poverty and Health in Africa, in DYING FOR GROWTH, supra note 80, at 92.
94. See Mahmood Monshipouri, State Prerogatives, Civil Society, and Liberalization: The
Paradoxes of the Late Twentieth Century in the Third World, 11 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 233, 241
(1997).
95. Schoepf et al., supra note 93, at 92.
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Germany, held to address the issue of oppressive debt burdens of the
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). It is still questionable whether
such initiatives can lead to increased standards of living in the
impoverished nations. Debt relief has come to be recognized widely as a
human rights issue. Many socioeconomic rights violations are said to be
closely linked to the issue of debt and debt relief. "Basic human rights,"
Eric Friedman argues, "do go unrealized because Mozambique is paying
$1.4 million every week in debt service, instead of spending the money on
education, health care, nutritional programs, and the like.""
V. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we turn to the role of the state in some thematic areas,
or more accurately case studies, such as the development-democracy
nexus, child labor, and health care. Many disagreements - such as
whether child labor is an abuse of human rights or a regrettable necessity
to counter poverty - shape the contours of moral debate in the
international community. Similarly, the controversy lingers on as to
whether an activist or minimalist role for the state would be more
appropriate in the struggle for upholding the right to health care. In the
ensuing discussions, several key questions confront us, of which the two
most relevant ones are: Should states be socially empowered to protect
certain basic economic and social rights? How is the political economy of
development related to human rights?
Contrary to popular perception, the connection between development
and democracy is not clear. There are many unknown variables involved
in such a relationship. Furthermore, the impact of globalization upon
development and democracy is differentiated and holds wide-ranging
consequences for the discourse of international human rights. An analysis
of the development-democracy nexus is essential to any broader
understanding of globalizing human rights standards.
A. Development-Democracy-Human Rights Nexus
1. Development-Democracy Relationship
Efforts to define and measure development goals and activities, as well
as to theorize about the role of foreign aid in promoting development, are
highly complex and evolve as world conditions change and more
96. In a particularly informative and stimulating essay, Eric Friedman writes that
"the forty Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) spent a total of about $8.6 billion per year
securing their debts as the 1990s drew to a close"-money that could have been spent on
social services to benefit their people. Calling for the relief of large debt burdens, Friedman
argues that such burdens facilitate human rights deprivations in many developing countries.
See Friedman, supra note 11, at 194.
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information becomes available.97 There continues to be disagreement
within the academic community and policy circles over what the
overarching goal of sustainable development should be, such as poverty
reduction or economic infrastructure development." The most effective
development models are those that "promote the full enjoyment of all
human rights: political, civil, cultural, social and economic."' This
realization has rendered poverty reduction, gender equality, and economic
grow, and grassroots participation in development essential to the
definition of sustainable development."
The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has linked
poverty to six pertinent priorities: basic human needs; women in
development and gender equity; infrastructure services; human rights,
democracy, and good governance; private sector development, and; the
environment. CIDA's findings nevertheless underscore the fact that no
single model can achieve poverty-reduction objectives.101
The link between development and democratic ideals continues to
invite controversy and debate. 2 While some stress the importance of this
link for human rights, others caution that unless these concepts are
understood and pursued in very particular ways-that is, in the context of
the liberal democratic welfare state-they may place human rights at risk.
Representing the latter perspective, Jack Donnelly challenges the position
97. See SARAH J. TISCH & MICHAEL B. WALLACE, DILEMMAS OF DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE: THE WHAT, WHY, AND WHO OF FOREIGN AID 45 (1994).
. 98. Many also refer to the right to development as the main objective. This
entitlement to development has been affirmed as a universal and inalienable right.
Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. res. 41/128, annex, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
53) at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986). The human rights approach to the eradication of
poverty is based on the premise that "the right to be free of the crushing poverty must be
counted among the most fundamental of human rights. Poverty is brutal. It is embedded in
all realms of the existence of poor people, and extends beyond lack of income." James Gustave
Speth, Poverty: A Denial of Human Rights, 52 J. INT'L AFF. 277, 282 (1999). Speth also argues
that "[i]mposing human rights conditions on development cooperation does not lead to
improved human rights standards," and may well serve only to penalize the population. See
id. at 291.
99. Id. at 291.
100. See id.
101. KERRY MAx, DAC INFORMAL NETWORK ON POVERTY REDUCTION - THE
CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY (CIDA) CASE STUDY 4 (1999), available at
<http://www.nsi-ins.ca/download/dac-cida.pdf>. The World Bank officials write that
development involves a range of goals, including equality, income, education, health, the
environment, culture, and social well-being. See WORLD BANK, ENTERING THE 21" CENTURY:
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999/2000, at 20 (2000).
102. Some analysts have argued that organizational fragmentation within both the
state and society has blocked reform efforts in some Latin American countries. This
fragmentation has promoted clientelism and segmentalism over universalism, enhancing the
power of privileged groups at the expense of disenfranchized groups. In Brazil, the
combination of cientelist political parties and a factionalized civil society has left the state as
the only vehicle to redistribute the country's wealth. The actions of the state have been
hindered by the continuing bureaucratic in-fighting and intense lobbying from privileged
groups. See KURT WEYLAND, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT EQUITY: FAILURES OF REFORM IN BRAZIL
17-49 (1996). As a result, Brazilian democracy has generated virtually no equity-enhancing
reforms. See id. at 3. This could foreshadow the emergence of a new brand of democracies
that have come to be known as democracies without equity.
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that democracy, development, and human rights (especially civil and
political rights) are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Donnelly
argues that democracy aims to empower the people and allocates
sovereign authority to them, while requiring little of the sovereign people
in return. Human rights, in contrast, have the goal of empowering
individuals, thereby limiting, not empowering the people and their
government. 13 Likewise, development is defensible only when it actually
contributes to economic and social rights. Ultimately, Donnelly notes,
"[hiuman rights are required to civilize both democracy and markets by
restricting their operation to a limited, rights-defined domain. " 'O'
Criticizing both free markets and pure democracy for sacrificing individual
rights to a "higher" collective good, Donnelly argues that "[o]nly when the
pursuit of prosperity is tamed by economic and social rights, such as when
markets are embedded in a welfare state, does a political economy merit
our respect." "
Many leaders of developing countries in the post-colonial era
rationalized their development programs in the name of order and
economic development. These ruling elites stressed emancipation from
colonial exploitation and dependency as the overriding national goal,
considering civil and political rights to be luxurious' freedoms their
countries could not afford. By the mid-1970s, democratic changes in
Southern Europe cast a shadow of doubt over such a line of reasoning as a
wave of democratization swept Eastern Europe and reached the South
American, Asian, and African continents.
Meanwhile, the globalization process (more particularly trade
liberalization and international capital flows) has left developing countries
with no other alternative but to open their economies to global markets.
The result has been mixed and often contradictory. On the one hand,
issues of foreign direct investment, good governance, transparency,
accountability, and the rule of law have all become intermeshed with other
requirements of sustainable development, such as economic development
and education. On the other hand, given the exacerbating effects of
economic globalization on inequalities between and among nations, new
complications have arisen for the application of democratic ideals and
human rights. There is an obvious tension between the promotion of
economic and social rights and global market forces. The latter aggravates
global inequalities in income and living standards. Market profitability
and economic efficiency drive the world into greater integration with
attendant risks and consequences such as "the race to the bottom" and the
curtailment of social safety nets for the poor. Some observers have called
this process "the globalization of poverty. " 1' Economic globalization, in the
103. Without challenging this basic contention, it can be argued that some civil and
political rights, such as the First Amendment rights, do empower people. See Jack Donnelly,
Human Rights, Democracy, and Development, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 608, 619 (1999).
104. Id. at 630.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Cees J. Hamelink, The Elusive Concept of Globalization, 1 GLOBAL
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words of Richard Falk, "poses the difficult question as to whether
governments locked into wider competitive frameworks retain the effective
discretion to ensure that their own citizens can satisfy basic human needs




We have yet to solve the problem of whether business is good for
human rights or human rights is good for business, or whether
liberalization of economics will lead to the liberation of people. The debate
rages on between the so-called "Washington Consensus" emphasizing
neoliberal strategies and the "Southern Consensus" stressing
neostructuralism and the activist state/°n There is dubious validity to the
claim that economic globalization brings democracy. James Mittelman best
captures this point: "Although liberal democracy may prove convenient or
preferable to other methods of governance, the beneficiaries of
globalization have no inherent interest in promoting democracy.
" 1
0
The consequences of globalization for human rights are less certain.
Contemporary human rights scholars continue to disagree whether
increased participation in the global capitalist economy nudges a
government toward more or less respect for its citizens' human rights.
David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards, who have conducted an
empirical study on this issue by looking at a sample of 79 developing
countries around the world for the years 1981-96, explored the link
between physical integrity rights (extrajudicial killings, torture,
disappearances, and political imprisonment) and post-Cold War trends
such as globalization, democratization, domestic conflicts, and interstate
conflicts."1 They found "that both democratization and participation in the
more globalized economy are associated with post-Cold War improvement
in government respect for the right not to be politically imprisoned.""'
After the Cold War ended, they noted, the average level of democracy,
domestic conflict, interstate conflict, and participation in the global
economy increased; nevertheless, the average level of torture,
disappearances, and killings did not significantly drop. 2
DIALOGUE 1, 5 (1999).
107. RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE 101-102 (1999).
108. See Gore, supra note 61, at 789.
109. MIT=ELMAN, supra note 2, at 247.
110. See David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, Respect for Human Rights After the
End of the Cold War, 36 J. PEACE RESEARCH 511, 513 (1999).
111. Id.
112. Cingranelli and Richards show that throughout the Cold War, more than half of
the 79 governments in their sample held 50 or more political prisoners. In 1993, in contrast,
only 24 governments held 50 or more political prisoners. By 1996, the number of governments
in this category increased to 25. See id. at 524. From 1990 to 1996, in 28 of the 79 countries,
there was improvement in the right not to be imprisoned. See id. at 526. Respect for this right
improved in every region of the world. See id. at 525. During this period, however, full
respect for the right against extrajudicial killings decreased from 32 to 31 countries, full
respect for the right against being disappeared decreased from 49 to 48 countries, and full
respect for the right not to be tortured decreased from 13 to 10 countries. See id. at 524.
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2. Unlinking Democracy from Human Rights
The globalization of democracy has pushed a universal movement
toward political liberalization and human rights. Pressures have mounted
for political reforms in many parts of the world. But this globalization can
be a shallow conception of democracy that romanticizes elections and leads
to the rise of illiberal democracies, with ominous implications for
economic, civil, and religious liberties. Since the end of the Cold War,
many previously authoritarian governments have democratized,. but
largely in this shallow way as a result of international pressure, not
indigenous social and political developments.
113
Under what conditions do elections make sense? Underscoring the
importance of pre-election variables, scholars of the developing world
often argue that creating relative economic well-being and social welfare
for the people is necessary for meaningful elections. "Surely," they say,
"voting and elections will count for little in an atmosphere of crippling
poverty, want, and despair." 14 Without economic security and minimal
levels of development, it is argued, elections and expansion of civil society
are unlikely to produce desired outcomes. If anything, they result in
potentially uncertain situations for the ruling elites. Russia and many
African countries are representative examples."'
It is important to distinguish between "fabricated" elections, where the
process is flawed, and elections that might be procedurally correct,
observed by the international community, yet bound by other constraints,
such as economic conditions, fledgling civil society or its lack thereof, and
the operation of international financial institutions. In the latter case, while
elections may be justified, attention needs to be equally focused on tackling
structural problems. Increasingly, the ruling elite and/or military have
manipulated electoral laws and processes to perpetuate their rule. In
Africa, democratically elected regimes have relapsed into autocratic rule,
stifling opposition parties. In some cases, civil wars have rendered next to
impossible any move toward the democratizing process. In the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, for instance, the two-and-a-half year civil war,
pitting the Congolese and their allies, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe,
against rebel groups and their backers, Rwanda and Uganda, has
complicated the prospects of democratization. The DRC's new president,
Joseph Kabila, has adopted a reconciliatory posture toward the rebels. 6
The electoral experiences of many other African countries have been
strikingly similar. There seems to be a slow but perilous
reinstitutionalization of autocratic regimes clad in democratic garb, a
political reality characterized by Said Adejumobi as "elections without
113. See id. at 532.
114. Said Adejumobi, Elections in Africa: A Fading Shadow of Democracy, 21 INT'L POL.
Sci. REV. 59,62 (2000).
115. See Encarnaci6n, supra note 69, at 9.
116. See Henri E. Cauvin, Congo Leader Offers Talks To the Rebels; Tensions Ease, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 16, 2001, at A6.
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choice" or caricature elections, which rarely, if ever, advance the cause of a
genuine democracy."7
The fact remains that democracy alone does not bring about
constitutional liberalism. This is evident in many countries, including
Argentina, Kazakhistan, Belarus, Romania, Slovakia, Bangladesh, Russia,
Peru, and Pakistan."" Regular elections, have failed to enhance the rule of
law, human autonomy, and dignity. While democracy is flourishing all
over the world, constitutional liberalism-which is to say, a combination of
free/fair elections, the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the
protection of basic liberties-is not.1 9
In Peru, a combination of weak institutions, a culture of mistrust in
such institutions, and poor economic conditions has accounted for
democratic backsliding. Since President Alberto Fujimori, who was first
elected in 1991, won a third five-year term in a rigged electoral process in
late May 2000, the notion of "rogue democracies" has entered the political
lexicon and the current debate surrounding the viability of the democracy
project in developing countries. 20 Peru's election has enforced the position
that elections alone fail to guarantee free expression or fair treatment of
minorities. Most Peruvians had little respect for institutions such as the
courts and the congress. The lack of legitimate institutions, along with
widespread poverty, led many Peruvians-who were more interested in
the hope of employment than the quality of their democracy-to believe
that Fujimori was the man on horseback. 21 Fujimori's grip on power
weakened in the fall of 2000 when it was revealed that Vladimiro
Montesino, the head of national intelligent service, bribed an opposition
congressman. Fujimori then called for new elections but decided not to
participate in them. A few weeks later he left the country for Japan and
never returned. This episode demonstrated why democracy in Peru was
(and still is) largely a masquerade. During his tenure in office (1990-2000),
Fujimore undermined the key institutions of democracy in order to
consolidate his hold on power. A true and meaningful democracy will take
at least as long."
Another contributor to the emergence of "illiberal democracies"
around the world are situations that have given developed countries, the
IMIF, and the World Bank a freer hand in demanding economic and
political reform as a condition to grant foreign aid to these developing
countries. To accommodate these demands, Cingranelli and Richards
117. FALK, supra note 107, at 70. See also Cauvin, supra note 116, at 66 (calling such
elections fabricated and electoral coup d'etats).
118. See Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec.1997,
at 22-23.
119. See id. at 22-24.
120. See Barbara Crossette, A Different Kind of Rogue: When Democracy Runs Off the
Rails, N.Y. TIMEs, June 4, 2000, at § 4, 1.
121. See Dennis Jett, Peru's Dark Future, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 2, 2000, at 11;
Clifford Krauss, Autocrat? Democrat? Well, Both, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2000, at §4, 4.
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explain, "many 'illiberal' democracies have been created around the
world.""' In these countries, multiparty systems of political participation
have been legalized, elections scheduled, and political prisoners released
by former authoritarian rulers bent on manipulating the system to stay in
power. Despite these apparent steps toward democratization, these
leaders have secured their positions, returning to previous repressive
policies and manners after the elections. Cingranelli and Richards found
this process to apply in most newly democratized African states, arguing
further that the link between democratization and the release of political
prisoners remains questionable. 24
Historically, elections without broad consensus and tolerance have led
to colossal difficulties. The increasing practice of competitive elections in
Africa, for example, alone will not rectify widespread human rights
violations. Political and personal freedoms have in fact deteriorated in
several of the longest-surviving democracies of the developing world,
including India, Sri Lanka, Colombia, and Venezuela.l" Those countries
that lack a middle class, modernized civil institutions, an established
bourgeoisie, and necessary political infrastructure are not viable candidates
for democracy.
B. Child Labor
Now a widespread and growing problem in the developing world,
child labor is generally defined as regular participation of children in the
labor force to earn a living or supplement household income. Is child labor
a denial of human rights or essential to confronting crushing poverty?
How is the poverty trap idea related to child labor and schooling? What is
the relation between ILO standards and child labor? And finally, what are
the consequences of cuts in social spending, prescribed by neoliberal
economic development packages, for child labor? In the long run, the
solution for alleviating child labor conditions lies in elevating living
standards and improving human capital. This solution presupposes that
schooling and child labor are contradictory approaches for all children in
the developing world. This may not be the case. Moreover, in the short
run, the closure of sweatshops raises serious ethical concerns about the
plight of child laborers with less income available.
The consequences of globalizing labor standards for child labor in
developing countries are varied. According to International Labour
Organization estimates, approximately 250 million children work full or
part time, with the majority of them in developing countries: 61% in Asia,
32% in Africa, and 7% in Latin America.'26 While in South Asian countries
123. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, supra note 110, at 532.
124. See id.
125. Barbara Crossette, Democracies Love Peace, Don't They?, N.Y. TIMEs, June 1, 1997,
at E3 (quoting Larry Diamond).
126. See SUDHARSHAN CANGARAJAH & HAROLD COULOMBE, CHILD LABOR AND
SCHOOLING IN GHANA. (World Bank Working Paper no. 1844, 1997), available at
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child labor is predominantly in the manufacturing sector, in Africa 90% of
the children are involved in unpaid work and at household level
agricultural activities.27 In Ghana, national household surveys conducted
between 1987 and 1992 showed that of the 28% of children involved in
child labor more than two-thirds were also simultaneously attending
school. This survey casts doubt on the commonly held view that poverty
pushes children into the labor market; it also shows that the link between
poverty and child labor is strong but not essential. Poverty, however, is
significantly correlated with the decision to send children to school,
because there is a significant negative relationship between going to school
and working and thus a resultant loss of income."
An examination of the responses to an enrollment subsidy in
Bangladesh calls into question the "poverty trap thesis"-that is, that child
labor is a major factor perpetuating poverty by keeping children from poor
families out of school. Using a targeted school stipend to compare how
much child labor income substitutes for schooling, this study finds strong
effects on school attendance of the incentive provided by Bangladesh's
Food-for-Education program: "A stipend with a value considerably less
than the mean child wage was enough to assure nearly full school
attendance amongst participants .... The enrollment subsidy also reduced
the incidence of child labor." 129 This effect, however, accounted for a small
proportion of the surge in school enrollment. The reduction in the practice
of child labor by boys (and girls) represented about one quarter (and
eighth) of the increase in their school enrollment rate.1" This is accounted
for by the fact that "parents [were] clearly substituting other uses of their
children's time, so as to secure the current income gain from access to the
program with modest impact on earnings from their children's work."3 '
An ethical absolutist approach, which insists on abolishment of the so-
called "sweatshops" and imposing universal labor standards across the
globe, would not necessarily alleviate poverty. It could actually aggravate
it in the short run. Contrary to popular perceptions, one study has shown
that the effect of minimum wage legislation to prop up adult wages has the
potential to exacerbate the problem of child labor.'32 This complication
would pose a dilemma for the insertion of the "social clause" in
international trade agreements, not to mention strong resistance from
developing countries that consider such standards a form of
<http: //econ.worldbank.org/docs/766.pdf>.
127. See id. at 10.
128. See id. at 16.
129. MARTIN RAVALLION & QUENTIN WODON, DOES CHILD LABOR DISPLACE
SCHOOLING? EVIDENCE ON BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES TO AN ENROLLMENT SUBSIDY, (World Bank
Working Paper no. 2116,1999), available at <http://econ.worldbank.org/docs/828.pdf>.
130. See id. at 16.
131. Id.
132. See KAUSHIK BASU, INTRIGUING RELATION BETWEEN ADULT MINIMUM WAGE AND
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protectionism.
133
Without denying that the case for achieving minimal labor standards
for workers is compelling, some economists question the wisdom of using
minimum wage as a form of international labor standard."M Raising adult
wages through a minimum wage law, they argue, can in some cases have
the contradictory effect of increasing the amount of child labor. If the
increase in wage causes adult unemployment to soar, it is likely that
unemployed adults will send their children to work. This is a plausible
outcome given that in most developing countries unemployment benefits
are non-existent. Thus, "a minimum wage can result in a higher supply of
child labor." ' It should be understood, however, that any reference to
"universal labor standards" in this context is directed at a particular
standard-that of minimum wage and its effects on another human rights
issue (child labor)-and not all universal labor standards, which would
include banning child labor.
On balance, arguments against child labor point to the fact that the
problem is multifaceted: (1) factory owners, who take advantage of
vulnerable children, are intent on promoting their economic self-interest;
(2) politicians, media, and other public institutions, who treat child labor as
a non-issue, are publicly indifferent to it; (3) government export promotion
policies tend to gloss over the impact of such policies on child labor; (4)
government officials not only condone but in many cases benefit from child
labor; and (5) societal prejudice perpetuates the situation because major
portions of the more fortunate classes of society consider child labor of the
133. For an illuminating and comprehensive discussion on the "social clause" within
the context of trade mechanisms to improve working condition for women in the developing
world, see JULIE DELAHANTY, A COMMON THREAD: ISSUES FOR WOMEN WORKERS IN THE
GARMENT SECTOR 41-42, (The North-South Institute, May 17, 1999), available at
http://www.nsi-ins.ca/download/thread.pdf. Delahanty writes that "many favor 'social
clauses' in international trade agreements because, unlike many other mechanisms, they are
enforceable in ways that other international standards are not." Id. at 41. Furthermore, she
adds, such clauses cause "the fear that they will only protect traditionally male forms of
work." Id. Developing countries, Delahanty notes, are also highly skeptical of such clauses,
arguing that "the real motive is to reduce their wage-cost advantage and give developed
countries an excuse to discriminate against poorer country exports. As a result, no standards
have been included within trade agreements, with the exception of the NAFTA and Chile-
Canada side agreements." Id.
134. See Basu, supra note 132. In general, social scientists agree that workers should
have the right to collective bargaining; that child labor is a violation of human rights; that
workers should be protected from hazardous working conditions, and; that workers should
be able to "earn a living wage." See Virginia A. Leary, Globalization and Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS: NEW DIMENSIONS AND CHALLENGES 265 Uanusz Symonides ed., 1998). There
is also a broad agreement that globalization has weakened the deference to state. The latter's
ability to legislate all issues of labor standards has become limited. Julie Delahanty writes,
"The changing role of the state needs to be kept in mind when thinking about legislative
changes and reforms. The geographic spread of units of production within and between firms
is reducing the importance of purely national or local influences in the organization of work
and production. In more market-oriented economies, the role of the state and of government
agencies is often reduced. As a result, using international labor standards as a way of
ensuring the rights of informal sector workers has been an important strategy." Id. at 43
(citations omitted).
135. BASU, supra note 132, at 1.
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underprivileged a part of the natural order."3
While some children work for survival, others, who are in bonded
labor, work to repay debts incurred by their parents. Still others are either
kidnapped or recruited by unscrupulous agents to work away from home
as a source of cheap labor. The lack of a federal requirement in many
countries for compulsory education is also a major factor contributing to
the continued use of child labor."
Some ethical relativists tend to stress the hard realities facing these
children and their families. "In poor families," Shahidul Alam writes, "it is
simply understood that everyone has to work."' 9 Other apologists for
child labor have reflected the similar concern: "The choice for many
families in developing countries is not between sending a child to a factory
and sending a child to school, but, rather, between a factory that sells
goods for export and a factory that serves only the internal markets." 4"°
Under such circumstances, the families give priority to subsistence-by far
the most urgent priority-rather than the education of their children. The
latter is an important goal, but for those mired in poverty it falls further
down the ladder of priority. The logic of the situation is best captured in
oft-heard phrase: "The sad truth behind child labor is that for millions of
poor families, children are an economic asset, and often their only one."
4
1
To argue that the only way to confront child labor is for consumers and
governments to apply pressure through sanctions and boycotts is
simplistic. Following the introduction of the Child Labor Deterrence Act in
1992 by U.S. Senator Tom Harkin, the so-called "Harkin Bill," garment
employers dismissed an estimated 50,000 children from their factories,
approximately seventy-five percent of all children in the industry." The
mere threat of such an act panicked the garment industry, sixty percent of
whose products-nearly $900 million in value-were exported to the
United States in 1994 .' A series of follow-up visits by UNICEF, local
NGOs, and the ILO revealed that children went looking for new sources of
income and found them in less or non-regulated work such as stone-
crushing, street hustling and prostitution-jobs far more hazardous and
exploitative than garment production. In other cases, the mothers of laid-
off children had to quit their jobs to look after their children again resulting
in less household income.'"
Increasingly, however, global economic and legal convergence trends
136. See Bruce Weiner, The Use of Child Labor Violates Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 74, 78 (Mary E. Williams ed., 1998) [hereinafter Williams].
137. Id.
138. Id. at 80.
139. Shahidul Alam, The Use of Child Labor Does not Always Violate Human Rights, in
Williams, supra note 136, at 86.
140. Jean-Claude Khoury, The Re-emergence of Sweatshops, in STAND! GLOBAL ISSUES:
CONTENDING IDEAS AND OPINIONS 110, (Timothy C. Lim, ed., 1999).
141. Id. (quoting The Economist).
142. UNICEF, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN 60 (1997).
143. Id. at 23.
144. Id. at 60.
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toward condemnation of child labor. The U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF),
International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Labour
Program on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), and the Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) all point in this direction. A minimum
age on when a child can begin working is now a near universality feature
of the domestic laws across the world.4 5 But the plain reality is that global
governance has failed to prevail over the widespread local exercise of child
labor. Arguably, as countries industrialize, they tend to use child labor
initially, but they are likely to abandon it subsequently. Also, as the world
develops under the logic of global and industrial capitalism, economies
become increasingly interdependent.1" This trend in turn influences not
just the practice of child labor, but also other policy choices of far-reaching
implications for business and government decision-makers. Such trends
are certain to uphold the argument for universality of human rights in
general and the rights of children in particular. Although the argument
that use of child labor is inexorably linked to a country's current stage of
economic development holds to reason, it is equally true that developed
nations have grown beyond their massive dependency on child labor. The
case can therefore be made that heavy reliance on child labor is not
necessary to economic development.'47
The fact remains, however, that education will significantly reduce
child labor over the long run. Cuts in social spending worldwide have
severely undermined educational opportunities, raising hard questions
about such neoliberal policies." s  The majority of children's rights
advocates contend that the immediate abolition of all child labor is
unrealistic. The first priority, they note, should be to abolish the most
abusive forms of child labor, such as prostitution, bonded labor, and
hazardous working conditions.'49
C. Health as a Human Right
Health and human rights are interconnected and their promotion
fundamentally and inextricably intertwined.ln The effects of violations of
dignity and physical integrity on health (mental or otherwise) are as crucial
as the effects of poor health on dignity. Both the Universal Declaration of
145. See UNICEF, supra note 142, at 25. The ILO establishes a general minimum age of
15 years, but country practice varies. See id.
146. See John T. Rourke & Mark A. Boyer, WORLD POLITICS, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
ON THE WORLD STAGE 40-41 (3d ed. 2000). For a discussion raising serious questions about
the dominant script of globalization, see MITTELMAN, supra note 2, at 234-42.
147. See Hugh D. Hindman & Charles G. Smith, Cross-Cultural Ethics and the Child
Labor Problem, 19 J. Bus. ETHICS 21, 31-32 (1999).
148. See Carol Bellamy, Child Labour: Rights, Risks, and Realities, in GLOBAL ISSUES
99/00 186, 188 (Robert M. Jackson ed., 1999).
149. Weiner, supra note 136, at 74.
150. Jonathan Mann et al., Teaching Human Rights to Public Health Practitioners, in
HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 333, 340 (George J.
Andreopoulos & Richard Pierre Claude eds., 1997).
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Human Rights' and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights152 recognize that health is central to the dignity of the
person and that state commitment to the health of the population is a
fundamental human right. The realization of other rights is not possible if
an individual cannot maintain his/her own health: "Particularly crucial
health needs include the prevention of stillbirths and infant mortality; the
improvement of environmental and industrial hygiene; the prevention,
treatment, and control of diseases; and the provision of medical care to the
sick. ,53
It is a central argument of this paper that combating poverty,
addressing basic needs, and preventing and treating illness must be seen as
part of an integrated process of protecting and promoting human rights. It
is also important to keep in perspective the tension between globalization
and the right to health. One billion people are unable to secure clean water
and basic nourishment, "the most basic measure of disease prevention."'-"
An estimated three million people are dying each year from tuberculosis,
an infectious disease that is completely curable.' In 1995, 17.3 million
people died of bacterial, viral, or parasitic infections, giving further
credence to the thesis that "the disparities of risk and outcome are
embedded in complex biosocial realities." 56
At issue is access to health care. The broadest social determinants of
health--such as income inequality-must be considered in this discussion.
The field of social epidemiology elucidates the way discrimination,
oppression, exploitation, and degradation of human dignity harm health,
and how foundational social justice is to public health.5 7 Considerations of
dramatic income inequities have forced a change in approaches to the key
question, as commentators now ask, "Why are some societies healthier
than others?" rather than, "Why do some individuals get sick while others
stay healthy?"'
Earlier medical anthropologists regarded cognitivist approaches to
151. Section One of Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads:
"Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary
social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability,
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control."
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25, §1, G.A. Res 217A, U.N. GA OR, 3d sess., Res.
71, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948).
152. Article 12(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights reads: "The State Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health." International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.
153. CAROL DEVINE ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ESSENTIAL REFERENCE 107-08.
154. Paul Farmer, Foreward, in DYING FOR GROWTH, supra note 80, at xii.
155. PAUL FARMER, INFEcTIONS AND INEQUALITIES: THE MODERN PLAGUES 3 (1999).
156. Id. at 3-5.
157. See Nancy Krieger, Discrimination and Health, in SOCIAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 36, 67-68
(Lisa F. Berkman & Ichiro Kawachi eds., 2000).
158. Ichiro Kawachi, Income Inequality and Health, in SOCIAL EPIDEMIOLOGY, supra note
157, at 76, 91.
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culture as essential to the treatment of epidemics. However, recent debates
in the clinical and epidemiologic literatures have refocused attention on the
social causation of disease. As Paul Farmer explains: "Poverty has long
been the chief risk factor for both acquiring and dying from tuberculosis." 9
Questioning the immodest claims of causality made by medical
anthropologists, Farmer writes,
Almost unexamined has been the relationship between the social
reproduction of inequalities and the persistence of tuberculosis. To my
knowledge, there have been no studies of the mechanisms by which steep
grades of inequality might exacerbate resistance to antituberculous drugs.
Our failure to discern a political economy of risk both for the development
of [multiple drugs resistant tuberculosis] MDRTB and also for suboptimal
treatment may be related to a desire to link our (perfectly legitimate)
investigations of the shaping of personal experience by culture to
(inaccurate) claims of causality. 6°
Farmer deflates the myth of an exaggeration of personal agency in
favor of examining the social inequalities in health, positing that in a very
real sense, "inequality itself constitutes our modern plague. The burdens
of inequality are primarily borne by the poor and marginalized, for not
everyone can claim victimhood, despite the self-serving identity politics
and 'soft relativism' of our times."
1 61
The right to health and health care as an obligation of governments to
establish and meet health standards is often a point of controversy between
those who support an activist role for the state and those who wish for
minimal interference with the free market." An alternative view
emphasizes the role that individuals and non-governmental organizations
can play in promoting public health." The transnational support for the
right to health has dramatically risen. Many NGOs have committed
themselves to collecting accurate epidemiological data and information on
health conditions throughout the developing world. Since the 1980s, the
Philippines' NGOs, like the Medical Action Group (MAG) and the
Philippine Action Concerning Torture (PACT), have become connected
with international solidarity in relation to facilitating forensic technology
transfer."
159. FARMER, supra note 155, at 257.
160. Id. at 258.
161. Id. at 15.
162. SEYOM BROWN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN WORLD POLITics 85 (2000).
163. For more information on this see generally, George J. Annas, Human Rights and
Health-The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 50, 339 NEW ENGLAND J. MED., 1778, 1780-
81 (1998). Annas notes that many groups of physicians have stressed the link between
promoting public health and human rights, including International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War and its US affiliate, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Physicians
for Human Rights, Doctors without Borders, and Global Lawyers and Physicians. The
Consortium for Health and Human Rights has provided a forum for cooperation among these
health-related NGOs.
164. See Richard P. Claude, The Right to Health: Transnational Support for the
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Pressures to improve workplace and environmental conditions
throughout the world have given developing countries a voice on the
world stage and highlighted the inequities and biases of globalization's
politicoeconomic structure.' 5 By most accounts, the world's health has
improved.' 66  The World Health Organization (WHO) has reported
important gains in public health on an international scale: "We now have
the technical capacity to eradicate nearly all nutritional deficiencies and
infectious diseases."'67 Such dramatic improvements, however, have either
bypassed the poor of the developing world or have been unevenly
distributed throughout the world. In 1998, the director of the WHO
declared: "The developing world carries 90 percent of the disease burden,
yet poor countries have access to only 10 percent of the resources that go to
health.""6 Increasingly, practicing physicians, public health officials, and
social scientists call attention to social forces, processes, and conditions that
determine the health of the poor by largely affecting the patterns of
morbidity and mortality: "We are only now beginning to understand the
mechanisms by which social inequality is in and of itself pathogenic.,
69
Similarly, experts argue that AIDS in developing countries-especially
in Africa, the continent most dramatically affected so far-is primarily a
welfare and education issue, not merely a medical one. Many of those at
risk of AIDS cannot read, have never used a condom or been tested, and
cannot afford the drugs that Americans have.7 It is vitally important to put
in perspective how poverty impacts and accelerates the spread of
HIV/AIDS: "An HIV-positive American can focus on his T-cell counts; an
HIV-positive African in a rural village still has to focus on finding clear
water and food." 7' In the latter's case, "They have to do high-risk things to
165. FALK, supra note 107, at 128-29.
166. The World Health Organization's (WHO's) 1998 annual report shows that
general indicators reflect important gains in public health on the global scale: average
worldwide life expectancy increased from 48 years in 1955 to 66 years in 1998; the worldwide
infant mortality rate reduced from 148 per 1,000 live births in 1955 to 59 per 1,000 live births in
1995; in 1955, nearly 21 million children died before they reached age five. In 1997, slightly
fewer than 11 million children died prior to their fifth birthday. A closer look, however, shows
that these signs of dramatic improvements are misleading. Aggregate statistics, for instance,
fail to demonstrate the fact that health gains are unevenly distributed and are, in fact, marred
by increasing disparities between the world's healthy and the world's poor. According to the
same report, more than 50 percent of the people in the world's 46 poorest nations lack access
to modem health care; nearly three billion people in developing countries are without access
to sanitation facilities; more than one billion individuals in the developing world do not have
access to safe drinking water; approximately 600 million urban dwellers in the developing
world live in what the WHO describes as life-and-health-threatening homes and
neighborhoods; and in 1998, two-fifths of all the people who died in the world died
prematurely. See Joyce V. Millen, et. al, Introduction: What is Growing? Who is Dying?, in DYING
FOR GROWTH, supra note 80, at 4.
167. Id. at 4.
168. Id. at 4 (quoting WHO Director General Gro Harlem Brundtland).
169. Farmer & Bertrand, supra note 88, at 87.
170. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., No Limit: Writing the Bill for Global AIDS, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 2000, at §4, 1.
171. Id. at 6
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put bread on the table.'
'
17
As noted in the section on economic and financial dilemmas, structural
adjustment programs (SAP) policies, by failing to curtail poverty, have
contributed to accelerating the pandemic. Many SAP measures, such as
currency devaluation, not only take resources away from the fight against
AIDS but also cause social problems and reactions that can make people
more vulnerable to HIV. 73 Under such circumstances, the risks to women's
biomedical health care are even higher. Demonstrating this grave injustice,
some public health experts observe:
Women, and especially adolescent females, are more vulnerable than
men to sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), for both biological and social
reasons. They are heavily stigmatized if their affliction becomes known.
Because many health services primarily target married women or mothers,
and are unable to provide private examining spaces, or even treat women
courteously, at-risk women are often discouraged from seeking care. User
fees are even greater deterrent to successful STD treatment. 174
SAP-related currency devaluation has raised debt levels by 40 to 50
percent in most African countries. These debt burdens are unsustainable."
In virtually every case, African experts note, spending cuts, as directed by
SAPs, are "concentrated on politically easy targets-health, education, and
support for small farmers-while the interests of the powerful and the
wealthy are protected by the state."76
Neoliberal economic globalization, which emphasizes the privatization
of state-run social programs in developing countries, is certain to have
negative consequences for upholding certain rights such as the right to
health. The privatization of health services in developing countries affects
rich and poor quite differently. Peru is typical. About half of the Peruvian
population survives on less than two dollars per day. They have very
limited say in determining social policy and surely not much stamina to
endure the negative consequences of the privatization of the health care
system. 7' Peru's Health Law of 1997, which aimed at bolstering the
Peruvian health-care system through promoting efficiency and choice, has
done little to forego disease and mortality among the poor Peruvians.
Critics warn about the moral and physical hazards of privatization: "By
imposing the criterion of choice on people who are in no position to exercise
it, health-care reformers have prioritized financial outcomes over health
172. Id. at 6 (quoting Anthony Kinghorn).
173. Schoepf et al., supra note 93, at 106-08.
174. Id. at 109.
175. See id. at 120-121.
176. Hartmut Krugmann, Overcoming Africa's Crisis: Adjusting Structural Adjustment
Towards Sustainable Development in Africa, in BEYOND ECONOMIC LIBERAIUZATION IN AFRICA:
STRUCTRUAL ADJUSTMENT AND THE ALTERNATIVES 129, 147 (Kidane Mengisteab & B.
Ikbubolajeh Logan eds., 1995). For more on the social dimensions of SAPs, see Mahmood
Monshipouri, State Prerogatives, Civil Society, and Liberalization: The Paradoxes of the Late
Twentieth Century in the Third World, 11 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 240-42 (1997).
177. Jim Yong Kim, et al., Sickness Amidst Recovery: Public Debt and Private Suffering in
Peru, in DYING FOR GROWTH, supra note 80, at 129.
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outcomes, and further imperiled the health of the poor."78
The rising economic and political clout of transnational corporations
(TNCs) and multinational corporations (MNCs) has undermined
governments' efforts to make policy independent of corporate interests.
Since governments are now vying with each other to attract MNCs, the
balance of power has definitely tilted in favor of the MNCs and away from
host governments. States, for instance, have been forced to lower their
labor and environmental standards as well as the taxes foreign companies
are required to pay. This has led to a downward, standard-lowering
bidding cycle known as the "race to the bottom."
179
In both the developing and developed world, the fear that increasing
pressures in industry are driving standards into a race to the bottom are
understandably widespread. Fierce international competition threatens job
security, lowers wages and erodes both environmental and labor
protection standards. Greater economic openness could lead countries to
relax environmental standards, seeking to attract firms by reducing their
cost of doing business. Many trade unions in Europe fear the search for
greater competitiveness will bring about a downward spiral in pay in a
race to the bottom that will threaten the living standards of their members.
Large pharmaceutical, biotechnology, for-profit health-care providers,
and health insurance corporations have played an enormous role in the
corporatization and commodification of health. That is to say, achieving
higher returns for shareholders has become a greater priority than
protecting the public health. The commercial interests of pharmaceutical
TNCs override the goal of combating diseases that routinely afflict the
world's poor. Few transnational pharmaceutical firms have attempted to
develop new treatments for the world's most threatening infectious
diseases, such as malaria or tuberculosis."'
Inwhat amounts to "the race to the bottom," TNCs in many industries
tend to locate near or in low-income areas. TNCs in extractive industries
locate where the resources are, and probably in some industries have to
locate in relatively well off areas because of infrastructural and
technological needs. With little or no control over their activities and also
with little incentive to regulate their environment practices, TNCs'
operations have had devastating consequences for rural lands and local
subsistence patterns.18 1 All this is not to deny the complicity or greed of
government officials, as the case of environmental degradation caused by
TNCs such as Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria has demonstrated. Royal
Dutch Shell's oil exploration and production since 1958 have resulted in
deadly environmental damages to the 6 million people living in the Niger
River Delta named "Ogoni" after the area's dominant ethnic group. The
Shell's operations were illegal under the environmental laws of most
178. Id. at 152.
179. Joyce V. Millen & Timothy H. Holtz, Dying for Growth, Part I: Transnational
Corporations and the Health of the Poor, in DYING FOR GROWTH, supra note 80, at 184.
180. Id. at 220-21.
181. Id. at 193.
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industrial countries: constant gas flaring, open and unlined toxic waste
pits, aged and corroding pipelines carrying oil above ground at high
pressure, and chronic oil spills. In addition to suffering enormous
environmental destruction, the residents of the Ogoni region who
protested against such operations were subjected to systematic violence by
the country's military regimes. In 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa, an author and
activist who organized a protest movement called Movement for the
Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), along with eight other tribal
leaders who protested against continued environmental damage were
arrested by the government and subsequently killed.18 2
This case clearly illustrates that government interests and those of
Royal Dutch Shell were symbiotically intertwined. Exaggerating the TNCs'
role in developing countries, some experts have noted that "the expansion,
consolidation, and rising power of TNCs are a major-in many contexts the
chief-obstacle to improving health among the poor." 3 The corrupt ruling
elite of Nigeria and their unwillingness to account for how they used oil
tax revenue also played an important role in the country's failure to secure
financial assistance from the IMF. T' It was, to a large extent, the extreme
inequalities in the distribution of resources and economic power that
allowed corporate practices inflict enormous harm on the most
marginalized segments of the society."n
In short, broader access to and availability of resources for the most
economically and socially disadvantaged remain the key concern. Lessons
of the Cuban case demonstrate that the distribution of resources within a
country is far more significant than the overall GNP in affecting health
outcomes; that there are economic options that distribute sacrifices the
poor are expected to make differently; and that massive social change to
improve the health of the poor is more effective that targeting vulnerable
sectors with specific programs.1' Despite its low per capita GDP, Cuba has
the lowest infant mortality and under 5 years old mortality rates in Latin
America. Cubans enjoy a longer life expectancy at birth, are among the
most educated in the Latin American region, and have achieved health
standards rarely matched in the region. Notwithstanding variations in
income levels among provinces, Cubans in general have are well provided
for in terms of health care.8 7  During the past 20 years, the Cuban
government has effectively mobilized its human, material, and scientific
resources to attended to several health problems, including an outbreak of
dengue fever in 1981, the discovery of AIDS in Cuba in 1986, and an
epidemic of neuropathy in 1993.18
182. See id. at 194-95.
183. Id. at 222.
184. See CHARLES W. L. HILL, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: COMPETING IN THE GLOBAL
MARKET PLACE 114 (2000).
185. See Millen & Holtz, supra note 180, at 223.
186. See Aviva Chomsky, The Threat of a Good Example: Health and Revolution in Cuba,
in DYING FOR GROWTH, supra note 80, at 332.
187. See id. at 335.
188. See id. at 337.
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VI. CONCLUSION
How to protect human rights in the face of global changes remains a
nagging question. Globalization of human rights standards tends to
overlook the complexity of the local dilemmas and politics of developing
countries. Despite the pervasive effects of globalization, both as a process
and ideology, local variables have a major impact on success or failure of
adaptation. Domestic politics and political institutions will, to a large
extent, determine how countries manage to absorb the shocks of
globalization." 9 Any theoretical global consensus will do little to curb the
deprivation of human rights on the ground in the developing world.
Globalization presents more dilemmas than choices for developing
countries. Will the adoption of global human rights standards constrain
states' choices at a time when politics are national, business is global, and
civil society is rapidly becoming transnational? There exists, some scholars
have cautioned, "a broad cumulative trend toward the social
disempowerment of the state.""1 The social re-empowerment of the state is
imperative. The erosion or disintegration of state authority in many
developing countries has been responsible for the breakdown of order and
the ensuing egregious human rights violations. Many experts have argued
that instituting the rule of law as a prerequisite for norm-abiding behavior
requires effective state authority. They have particularly noted that
"[h]uman rights campaigns should be about transforming the state, not
weakening or even abolishing it."
191
The dynamics of health provision and child labor demonstrate that
government intervention is necessary. The processes of sustainable
development and democratization support the argument that state
strength cannot be separated from their political legitimacy and coherence.
States should be empowered to protect socioeconomic rights. Unless the
state is mandated to protect these rights, strong elites cannot be justified.
Such a protection cannot be divorced from the political economy of
development. The difficulty is how to balance growth, equity, and
competition as states become further integrated into the global economy.
Effective governance by states when faced simultaneously with globalizing
and localizing dynamics remains a formidable task.
The globalizing neoliberal culture of consumerism and individualism
creates tensions for the kind of social order sought by many in the
developing world. Despite a theoretical optimism that globalization will
enable poverty-stricken, non-industrial nations to pull out miracles of
economic and social development, there is growing evidence that in reality
189. See Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Globalization: What's New? What's
Not? (And So What?), 118 FOREIGN POL'Y 104, 117 (2000).
190. RICHARD A. FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS HORIZONS: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE IN A
GLOBALIZING WORLD 1 (2000).
191. Thomas Risse & Stephen C. Ropp, International Human Rights Norms and
Domestic Change: Conclusions, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS
AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 234, 277 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999).
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no groups are more adversely affected by the unforeseen disruptions
brought by globalization than women, children, and the poor.
Neoliberal globalization renders the choice between an activist state
and the free market contentious, leaving NGOs with much power in
defining the contours of moral discourse in the developing world.
Economic globalization leads to the loss of "economic" sovereignty,
subjugating states to capital flows and compromising their democratic
potential. There is no consensus on the relationship between democracy
and the free market. That relationship is unclear and complicated. Unlike
those of the developed world, stable regimes in developing countries
traditionally are those that have had interventionist policies. The growth
of the market economy appears more dynamic than that of democracy,
with corporate economic rights taking precedence over individual human
rights.9
Global economic pressures undermine the ability of the developing
countries' governments to protect minorities or to preserve important
cultural and social elements within communities.9  These influences
increase the possibility of the fragmentation of states as decision-making
powers are relinquished to globalized economic institutions and
transnational corporations that have a dubious interest in and commitment
to the sociocultural welfare or the human rights of the people in
developing countries. T9
One of the most daunting questions facing the international human
rights community is how a commitment to the full range of human rights is
possible given unequal economic circumstances and priorities. Such a
commitment-if and when it exists-remains unrealistic at best. Human
rights activists must come to grips with the question of how best to protect
and promote human rights in the developing world given the realities and
dynamics of developments in international political economy. Without
taking such realities and dynamics into account, they will ultimately be
helpless to enhance the human rights conditions of the world's poorest
people. Global standards must be enforced while taking account of the
complexity and diversity of contexts, especially as they relate to the most
fragile and vulnerable social groups and states.
192. See Jacques Attali, The Crash of Western Civilization: The Limits of the Market and
Democracy, 107 FOREIGN POL'Y 54, 59-61 (1997).
193. See Robert McCorquodale & Richard Fairbrother, Globalization and Human Rights,
21 HUM. RTS. Q. 735, 756 (1999).
194. See id. at 765.
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